Originally Published December 31, 2009; Last Updated February 22, 2012; Last Republished February 22, 2012:
During our period of shrinking budgets; finite resources; prioritized threats; and difficult choices we can expect and should welcome passionate persuasive augments by our military components and their advocates. But, passionate persuasion must not yield to disjointed hyperbolic speculation or propaganda such as that expressed in
How the United States Lost the Naval War of 2015.
Kraska spins his speculative China hegemon fairytale out of Erickson and Yang's recent article on China's
investigation of using a conventional terminally controllable tactical reentry vehicle as a "carrier killer". The fairytale operationalizes Yang and Erickson's carrier killer
2, liberally sprinkles in a "handful" of Chinese carriers (one couldn't be built by 2015), shakes in some "quieter than Los Angeles-class" diesel Song submarines, adds a decade late pinch of "stealthy" AIP Yuan submarine, and casts a paralyzing spell over all counter measures, defenses, and ASW operations
3.
The Chinese Communist Party's desire for unification under communist party rule, expansive Law of the Sea Convention interpretation, and Southeast Asia hegemonic aspirations seem pretty clear. What's unclear is whether the Chinese Communist Party leadership seeks any war with the United States to address these issues, much less the War of 2015.
Unfortunately, Kraska's fairytale
4 does little to help clarify these issues. Wonder how the Kraska fairytale changes if we assume China's increased military budgets have more to do with domestic control than preparation for the War of 2015 with its biggest trading partner and debtor.
Res:
UPDATED 07/13/2011
Wikipedia, Ships of the People's Liberation Army Navy.
uTube:
UPDATED 02/22/2012
RAN Sea Power Conference 2012 (all sessions list), Rethinking Yesterday's Asia-Pacific Order:
UPDATED 09/13/2011 Andrew S. Erickson, at the Naval War College Museum pitching his latest book,
Chinese Aerospace Power: Evolving Maritime Roles—a seemingly more serious, nuanced, and regionally focused Erickson—still showing the Chinese Antiship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)/Carrier cartoon animation.
The primary ASBM segments are at approximate elapsed time ranges of 27:00-31:00 (lecture) and 57:00-102:00 (Q&A).
UPDATED 09/05/2011 A nation can mistakenly perceive its military domination for a cosmopolitanism that detrimentally masks its parochialism. The inevitable decline differs little for a nation that believes it can eschew cosmopolitanism by directly enforcing its parochialism via military domination.
UPDATED 04/15/2011 Some interesting comments on the changes of (re)rising Asian power and cooperation for the benefit of the commons (public good).
Blogs:
UPDATED 03/07/2011
Indian Express, China challenges US dominance in Asia-Pacific.
UPDATED 01/09/2010
UCS, Exaggerated Claims About China’s Missiles. Post responds to Stokes and Blumenthal's
WP, Why China's missiles should be our focus
UPDATED 11/19/2010
WSJ, China’s Military Ambitions: A Walking Tour. More China carrier killer hype based on a montage—wonder what inferences the author or China form from our network centric warfare montages? A more interesting caption for this article would be, "China sells missiles like America sells cars".
UPDATED 11/19/2010
ASE, China Testing Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM); U.S. Preparing Accordingly–Updated With Latest Analysis & Sources.
Assuming China has flown an integrated ASBM it should publish the missile's telemetry; alternatively DoD should publish the missile's telemetry. This interesting post is periodically updated with relevant information.
UPDATED 05/15/2010
Diplomat, China Set for Naval Hegemony.
A more circumspect, if still provocative Karaska continuing on the potential for China regional sea hegemony, including a few examples of China's admittedly clumsy-gangly-teenage-bully maritime behavior. Refreshingly, this time Kraska suggests cooperation and partnership as one possible outcome to a testosterone ladened teenage bully with the potential for provoking a punch
ed in the nose (an outcome likely not lost on China's leadership). Fortunately, cooperating and partnering, is already underway and happily the United States is fast redirecting its focus and resources to catch-up, including cooperating with China! (
OpenCRS, US-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress, July 2010 for a list of China-US contacts 1993-2009;
WP, As U.S. officials begin visit to Beijing, relations are 'sound,' China says for latest non-military visit, September 06, 2010.) However, managing periodic playground bullying and fights is far from war and does not justify our current obscene and exorbitant defense budgets or ever more costly and exotic weapons systems. Moreover, Karaska's implicit inferences from North Korea's recent maritime behavior seem wildly speculative, wide of any mark or current evidence, and inconsistent with China's current behavior and military chain of command.
UPDATED 03/18/2010
USNI, China’s Navy: Hey, let’s not panic…. Nice ship and sub tally with some cautionary words (plus a map). Nations with advanced and well functioning civil society institutions may not fully appreciate how awkward a nation lacking those institutions can respond, particularly during times of shocks and transitions. It's delightful to observe China (at all levels) trying to play with its peers, notwithstanding the periodic bullying, awkward moments, and playground fights. The intense inclination of those residing behind the walls of
Zhongnanhai to move China behind walls must at times be overwhelming?
Web:
UPDATED 02/16/2012
CRS, China Naval Modernization RL33153 dated February 2012 (Courtesy of FAS Secrecy Blog)
A quick summary of open source issues and concerns related to China's PLAN decade and a half modernization.
Fortunately, the prior "carrier killer" hype has significantly subsided
--or paraphrasing a former CNO, what can go through the bottom of a ship is of more interest than what can go through its top.
Nice to read an express acknowledgement that in modern naval warfare qualitative predominates quantitative factors--an observation often lost on the uninformed or manipulated by the informed seeking to misinform the uniformed:
"...In recent years, the warfighting capabilities of navies have derived increasingly from the sophistication of their internal electronics and software. This factor can vary greatly from one navy to the next, and often cannot be easily assessed by outside observation. As the importance of internal electronics and software has grown, the idea of comparing the warfighting capabilities of navies principally on the basis of easily observed factors such as ship numbers and tonnages has become increasingly less valid, and today is highly problematic...."--China Naval Modernization--
Moreover, there are simply no short-cuts or substitutes for the many years of practice and experience required to optimally operate a platform's hardware and software given an expected warfare scenario. Now consider that in modern naval warfare your platform is optimally operating as part of a complex dynamic multinodal mesh
!
UPDATED 01/15/2012
CNAS, Cooperation from Strength. The United States, China and the South China Sea (pdf) Provides a cursory description of the South China Sea boundary and consequent resource disputes and disputants.
Cooperation from Strength is an aphorism for the expenditures on an expansive naval fleet to perpetuate our unilateral global police power. An aphorism that is more nonsensical and discouraging of cooperation than "mistress marriage maintenance".
Cooperation from Strength simply complains that China uses economic coercion on the South China Sea disputants and others; opportunistically substitutes its domestic law for international law; increased its expenditures on military development; and free rides on our heretofore unilateral provision of global police power (the first three complaints are tactics not unfamiliar to our nation and the last is exactly what
Cooperation from Strength seeks to perpetuate!).
Not sure how the above complaints justify the expenditures on an expansive naval fleet to perpetuate our unilateral global police power? The complaints seem more supportive of the need to develop a multilateral cooperative framework.
UPDATED 01/13/2012
IHS Janes, Analysis: US' Asia-Pacific strategy provokes mixed response from China
Discusses the recently published "
Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense (pdf)".
UPDATED 12/15/2011
NDU, Chinese Navy: The PLA Navy’s Antiaccess Role in a TaiwanContingency
Article by Michael McDevitt published in National Defense University's,
The Chinese Navy (chapter 8) that moves the China AntiAccess (A2/AD)
13 challenge away from "arm-waving and shocked amazement" to "more difficult to surmount than the antiaccess capabilities it faced during the Cold War
14 from the [former] Soviet Union".
Refreshingly, in addition to placing the AntiAccess strategy in a historical context the article lightly anchors it to a basic, if evolving military doctrine.
"If the PLA can master and field this weapons system, it will be able to present as serious a challenge to the U.S. Navy as the one presented by Soviet Backfire-launched cruise missiles before the introduction of the Aegis radar system. Aside from the technical challenge associated with missile warhead design, the command and control problem of determining an accurate location of an aircraft carrier, getting that information to a missile firing unit in a timely fashion, and translating positional information into a guidance solution for the missile which has to include missile time of flight before the target ship moves beyond the terminal seeker’s window—are also issues.[reference to footnote 48 omitted.] The central point is, however, that these all appear to be solvable problems. In this author’s judgment, this capability, assuming that it is eventually successfully fielded, when combined with the PLAN’s robust submarine force, presents the U.S. Navy with an operational challenge that is actually more difficult to surmount than the antiaccess capabilities it faced during the Cold War from the Soviet Union."--China Navy--
China is not the first nation to investigate conventional ballistic missile maneuverability or have every junk scored as a potential threat by its putative adversaries.
Stated differently, military doctrine still prefers professionalism, experience, quality and deployability over hyperbole and simulations.
UPDATED 11/24/2011 Proceedings, Drawing Lines at Sea and
Diplomat, Yes, China Could Have a Global Navy
UPDATED 11/07/2011 MarketWatch, The Global Submarine Market 2011-2021
The global submarine market is expected to increase by a CAGR of 1.22% during the ten year period.
A total of 154 submarines are to be procured over the next decade, for an estimated cost of US $186.3 billion. The United States and Asian States accounting for 70.3% percent of the estimated market or 46.7% and 23.6%, respectively.
Fortunately, as budget realities associated with building and maintaining credible submarine fleets take hold the eventual size and dollar value of the forecasted market will likely decrease.
UPDATED 10/21/2011 Diplomat, China’s Overhyped Sub Threat
UPDATED 10/07/2011
A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the struggle for mastery in Asia
A well written and sourced introduction to the current state of the ongoing fascinating and intellectually challenging China-U.S debate—a debate with a gradient extending from “engage-appease” through “constrain-contain”.
Friedberg seems to prefer a gradient point nearer assertive engagement--maintain a qualitative distrustful engagement of China while maintaining an undefined (i.e. no quantitative measures specified) military superiority.11
Using a series of desultory statements (primarily chapters 10 and 11) Friedberg12 seems to conclude that an undemocratic China cannot be trusted; the Chinese people are powerless, and cannot be trusted to alter the authoritarian CCP; and a preponderance of our uninformed citizens; policymakers; China scholars; China-hands; and China-watchers; are too busy engaging China to understand or realize its stealthy and coercive designs.
Assuming Friedberg's qualitative generalized conclusions are accurate--after a costly decade-plus of hubris and failure to forcefully impose democratic civil society structures on authoritarian nations who will fault those willing to explore alternative approaches?
Today, authoritarian regimes seem to fall like dominoes in months with little or no application of external force, or usage of major weapons systems, and sometimes notwithstanding belated rhetorical support and encouragement!
Wonder how many Chinese citizens are aware that authoritarian regimes are falling like dominoes , notwithstanding the censorship efforts of the CCP?
UPDATED 09/03/2011
Project 204910, Asian Alliances in the 21st Century (pdf; includes forecast of regional submarines) As I read this breathless budget boosting (or busting depending on your perspective) broadcast I was reminded of a quote from Hu Angang's recent book
China 2020: A New Type of Superpower.
"To see ourselves as others see us is a rare and valuable gift, without a doubt. But in international relations what is still rarer and far more useful is to see others as they see themselves."--Hu Angang, China 2020 quoting Jacques Barzun--
Instead of condescendingly focusing on China's alleged ungrateful contention for the commons and lobbying to increase our $3 billion dollar Virginia-class submarine inventory it might be more useful and productive to focus on
Building the 21st Century U.S.-China Cooperation.
With some luck, a lot of consensus building, and leadership China will begin to carry some of the substantial burden for preserving and protecting the commons
9. No mean feat for a nation that hasn't even experienced its first "capitalist's" economic down-turn.
See
Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China for DoD's latest annual summary to Congress. The fact that China has generally referred to this report as "cock and bull" is a strong indicator that our DoD has not seen China as China sees itself--perhaps a general challenge for our nations?
UPDATED 07/16/2011
BaltimoreSun, Wrong course for Navy weapons research and
BaltimoreSun, We can't afford a naval arms race. Wonder what the performance-vulnerability-cost trade-offs (e.g. loads, speed, and CEP etc.) are for a mach 10-12 reentry vehicle(s) slowing for the purpose of executing a terminal course correction or maneuver...and for a counter measure projectile? Certainly basic and applied research can continue in the absence of costly major weapons systems development.
UPDATED 07/16/2011
Aviation Week, China Details Anti-ship Missile Plans.
UPDATED 07/13/2011
Aviation Week, China: Anti-Ship Missile Still In Development.
UPDATED 07/11/2011
CTV, China says U.S. spends too much money on military. Chen Bingde is quoted as saying the DF-21D variant ("carrier killer") is not operational, yet.
UPDATED 06/03/2011
AFPS, U.S. Will Maintain, Improve Engagement in Asia, Gates Says and
DoD, [SecDef June 04 speech at] International Institute for Security Studies (Shangri-La Dialogue).
"Our engagement in Asia has been guided by a set of enduring principles that have fostered the economic growth and stability of the region. I spoke about these principles last year, but I think it is worth reiterating our commitment to them once more today:
(1) Free and open commerce;
(2) A just international order that emphasizes rights and responsibilities of nations and fidelity to the rule of law;
(3) Open access by all to the global commons of sea, air, space, and now, cyberspace; and
(4) The principle of resolving conflict without the use of force."--SecDef, June 04, 2011 (local)
...and continually challenge China to do the same, notwithstanding periodic stalls and setbacks.
UPDATED 05/16/2011
CTV (AP), U.S. Navy drones: Coming to a carrier near China? and
Diplomat, US Drones vs China. United States announces usage of carrier based drones as part of a developing Asia stand-off strategy.
UPDATED 05/16/2011
NDU INSS, The New Security Environment – Implications for American Security in the Asia Pacific Region. A paper from the recent National Defense University 2011 Pacific
symposium. On May 18, 2011 China's PLA Chief of the General Staff, Chen Bingde is
scheduled to speak at the NDU.
UPDATED 02/21/2011
Reuters, U.S. to boost naval forces as China develops carrier: admiral.
UPDATED 02/15/2011
AJC, US admiral: Carrier killer won't stop US Navy.
...the Navy does not see the much-feared weapon [DF-21D aka "carrier killer"] as creating any insurmountable vulnerability for the U.S. carriers — the Navy's crown jewels."--AP quoting Vice Admiral Scott van Buskirk, commander of the U.S. 7th Fleet--
Not sure who understands China's DF-21D with "much fear" or our navy's aircraft carrier as a crown jewel? The caption for the TEL and missile photo included in the article should be viewed with some skepticism as to missile variant, DF-21C versus DF-21D?
UPDATED 01/12/2011
DefPro, China’s anti-ship ballistic missile operational.
"Dorsett [Naval Operations for Information Dominance, N2/N6] confirmed that the DF-21D had reached initial combat capability and confirmed it has been tested over land, but that the US had not observed an over-water test. He called the missile ‘competent’ and ‘capable’." --DefPro--
UPDATED 01/09/2011
NYT, U.S. Will Counter Chinese Arms Buildup.
It will be helpful if the major powers begin focusing on development and application of cooperative models to eventually replace conflict models. Nations fool only themselves with recurring threats of sustained cycles of competitive armed conflict—it's the language of fear and misunderstanding. Instead of our leaders challenging or encouraging China to accumulate or amass weaponry let them challenge and encourage the reduction of our own stockpile of weaponry. Instead of our leaders talking about countering "carrier killers" let them talk about deploying a cooperative carrier—an aircraft carrier cooperatively developed, operated, and maintained by China, Britain, Russia, and United States. The crews can rotate through three months of deployment; six months of joint education and training; and three months of rest and relaxation.
UPDATED 01/06/2011
NYT, China’s Push to Modernize Military Is Bearing Fruit and
Asia Sentinel, Running Silent, Running Deep Around Taiwan. Fortunately, some articles seem to be switching from the alarmist's voice—using a more balanced analyst's voice.
UPDATED 12/30/2010
BCJIA, Challenging US Command of the Commons: Evolving Chinese defense technologies as a threat to American hegemony? (Spring 2010) Article cites Project 2049's
China’s Evolving Conventional Strategic Strike Capability: the anti-ship ballistic missile challenge to U.S. maritime operations in the Western Pacific and beyond (September 14, 2009) for the proposition that ASBM initial capability will be available in 2010:
"...In contrast, ASBMs have the potential to destroy US carriers before they even enter the theater of operations around Taiwan – a potential “game-changer” in a military conflict. Based on a survey of Chinese technical and doctrinal publications, a number of US non-profit and government institutions claim that China has had significant success in its pursuit of an ASBM capacity. Although there has been no official acknowledgment by Chinese authorities, nor any known test of ASBM assets, an initial capacity is estimated to be available in 2010...."--Challenging US Command of the Commons, footnotes omitted--
UPDATED 12/30/2010
Popular Mechanics, What a War Between China and the United States Would Look Like. A Kraska-lite U.S.-China war speculation article—the article actually states:
"...Chances are that a war between China and the United States will not happen in 2015, or at any other time."
Guess it's a thought exercise?
UPDATED 12/30/2010
China SignPost, China Deploys World’s First Long-Range, Land-Based ‘Carrier Killer’: DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) Reaches “Initial Operational Capability” (IOC). Post makes the assertion in
exhibit 6:
"May:2010: CASIC 4th Dept. Deputy Director says DF-21D can hit "slow-moving targets" with a CEP of dozens of meters"
This likely refers to a statement attributed to Deputy Commander Wang Genbin, China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) Fourth Academy’s Fourth Design Department (English Translation)?:
"...China's solid missile from scratch, from small to large development team is also, by the team, "bombs and one satellite" spirit of the traditional spirit of space, developed missiles of China's first generation of solid, then 20 years from 1988 to the present time, the state invested only 3.0 billion development costs, has developed east on the 21st A, B, C, D four models, complete from the nuclear to both nuclear and conventional attack fixed targets to attack slow moving target changes, the precision CEP realized tens of meters from a few hundred meters and then to progress to truly create a model series, to meet the Second Artillery Corps in the new era, "responsible for deterrence against China's use of nuclear weapons, conducting nuclear counterattacks and precision strikes with conventional missiles." made important contributions to the country. The team win without pride, by defeat, hard work, walking is a better and more economical for development.--
English translation--
Also refer to
FAS Strategic Security Blog, Missile Mystery in Beijing (Oct 05, 2009)
UPDATED 12/28/2010
Diplomat, China’s Military Surprises. Commander, United States Pacific
Fleet Command
Admiral Robert F. Willard seems to assert that
China believes (not that he or our navy judges) its "carrier killer" has achieved initial operating capabilities (IOC)
8.
The admiral goes on to say that no over-water test of the entire system has been observed and that additional years of testing will be required. At a minimum IOC implies getting a missile to an aircraft carrier within some
circular error of probability (CEP)8.
It can be an equivalent test—for example drive a simulated aircraft carrier around in the desert and measure how close your "carrier killer" missile comes to hitting the "aircraft carrier" (i.e CEP).
We would detect the test whether over water or sand; probably intercept the telemetry; and with some luck measure the CEP. It's unnecessary and unhelpful for our military leaders (or others) to talk about potential threats cryptically, tangentially, or as if they are UFOs.
UPDATED 12/26/2010
WP, Military strength is eluding China by John Pomfret. It is
will be helpful to continually challenge any tendency to designate nations as "threats" then use such designation as justification for perpetuating confrontation, conflict, and containment over cooperation.
UPDATED 12/03/2010
Economist, The fourth modernisation.
UPDATED 10/19/2010
WT, LYONS: Countering China's aggression: Communist dictatorship presents trouble in Asia and abroad
Unsurprisingly the "Cold War" admiral thinks we're not doing enough to deter or counter (how about balance?) the Chinese aggression.
"Our message should be that the world's leading democracy will not be intimidated or bullied by another communist threat. In addition to remaining militarily superior, the United States also can begin to organize multinational political and economic pressures that could help accelerate China's evolution from communism. We led a similar campaign in the not-too-distant past."
Wonder what the admiral calls RIMPAC 2010? Of course it would be a gross mistake to treat China as Russia or the former Soviet Union or even communist. The admiral does raise the interesting question of how any future Chinese president, say 57 year-old
Xi Jinping would go about evolving China's authoritarian leadership? If only it were as easy and simple as driving the United States Third Fleet into the Yellow Sea or South China Sea—China's leadership would likely call the Third Fleet itself! Unfortunately, as the below post (The "China Threat" Isn't Military) generally notes such efforts are only likely to recall memories of the first
Anglo-Chinese Opium War7. Shortly after that conflict China's
Lin Zexu (林则徐) and
Wei Yuan (魏源) decided to enhance China's navy and coastal defenses, including denial of access defensive measures (for more details refer to
China's Self-Strengthening Movement)
UPDATED 10/19/2010
DefPro, The "China Threat" Isn't Military Some tersely interesting words on the "China Threat—a lot to ponder in this short post.
UPDATED 08/17/2010
DefenseLink, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2010 (5M pdf)
"China is developing an anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) based on a variant of the CSS-5 medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM). The missile has a range in excess of 1,500 km, is armed with a maneuverable warhead, and when integrated with appropriate command and control systems, is intended to provide the PLA the capability to attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean....The PLA is acquiring conventional MRBMs to increase the range at which it can conduct precision strikes against land targets and naval ships, including aircraft carriers, operating far from China’s shores out to the first island chain."--DoD 2010--
There is nothing new or shocking on the “carrier killer”; no mention of terminal guidance; elsewhere, the report states that OTH radar is being developed and can be coupled with satellite imagery. Total 2009 PLA military spending is estimated at ≅$140+ billion dollars on a budget of ≅$70+ billion dollars. (do all nation''s defense components overrun their proposed budget by 100%?) The report includes a nice "org-chart" of China''s military structure. Unfortunately, DoD persists in its opaque ways (submitting an opaque annex with the 2010 report) while expressing concern over China''s lack of transparency.
UPDATED 08/11/2010
DefPro, China''s New "Carrier-Killing" Missile Is Overrated. Article by Loren B. Thompson:
"Frankly, the U.S. Navy has so many options for negating Chinese antiship capabilities that I can only conclude the alarmists aren''t conversant with U.S. military preparations to be so worried about the nascent Dong Feng."
UPDATED 07/08/2010
Time, U.S. Missiles Deployed Near China Send a Message and
Asia Times, China flexes its naval muscle.
Two good articles on the deteriorating military cooperation between China and United States—both articles could be titled “Dangerous Games Adult Children Play”.
It seems useful to note that the much hyped China
DF-21 or DF-21A, the so called ballistic missile cum conventional "carrier killer", was not deployed or demonstrated. Left alone, the male military leadership
5 of both nations will tend toward what they''ve learned best; taunt, threaten, and intimidate—male children in America learn this behavior early.
The childhood game is called "King of the Hill". The game doesn''t change when the kids become adults or admirals, just the location (i.e. from the schoolyard playground
becomes to the South China and Yellow Seas) and costs.
Learning the childhood game "King of the Hill" is harmful by itself, but the adult logic our male military leaders (and some non-military leaders) assign to playing the childhood game as an adult is even more harmful.
Our adult male military leaders asserts it’s necessary to play the childhood game "King of the Hill" so we don’t have to really fight, really (this curious and bizarre logic will always lead to fighting, exactly the opposite of their stated assertion)!
Let’s try replacing both nations’ military leadership with female military leadership. American girls show no inclination or interest in playing the childhood game "King of the Hill" and I''ll bet China''s girls don''t either.
As always resolving one problem creates another—what will our female admirals do with all those lonely male admirals? Maybe they can fund the annual "King of the Hill" games for all our male admirals, minus the weapon systems.
UPDATED 03/30/2010
USNI, ''Get Off the Fainting Couch''. Craig Hooper and Christopher Albon argue that the "carrier killer" hype has been harmful and counterproductive. The hype legitimizes a non-operational missile and distracts from constructive dialogue with China and other regional nations. Dialogue aimed at highlighting how destabilizing such a missile would be for the region should it ever become operational.
UPDATED 03/30/2010
Wired, China Testing Ballistic Missile 'Carrier-Killer'. Article by Andrew Erickson includes some useful links but nothing new.
UPDATED 03/28/2010
SASC, Hearing on U.S. Pacific Command.... Includes a useful summary of the U.S. Navy Pacific Command Open Posture by Admiral Robert F. Willard. Of particular interest is China's Southeast Asia playground etiquette...:
Atlantic, Cyber Warriors. Nice article by James Fallows—it''s easy to overlook that much can be learned from those you do not fear.
UPDATED 03/17/2010
Atlantic, Cyber Warriors. Nice article by James Fallows—it''s easy to overlook that much can be learned from those you do not fear.
UPDATED 03/01/2010
CSBA, Why AirSea Battle? (pdf). Another shot (weak pun) at the China AntiShip Ballistic Missile (ASBM) story—this one is a slightly more circumspect version of Kraska''s Story within the context of some interesting China-Iran Anti-Access/Area-Denial conjecture. The author, Andrew F. Krepinevich, appears to cite the now familiar Yang and Erickson article for the proposition that the ASBM exists:
"...Perhaps the most notable Chinese addition is the anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM).
39" @ page 18 [footnote 39 is to Yang and Erickson]
But then later more accurately states:
"...To be sure, even if the PRC has a capable ASBM, a targeting system is still required to enable the [≈ mach 10+] reentry vehicle to hone in on its [highly mobile and heavily defended] target. Fielding the ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] component for its ASBM force represents a challenging task for the PLA...." @ page 19 [added to original text]
This type of general conjecture is routine and near ubiquitous within our defense industry, military components, and intelligence sectors seeking to understand and forecast the next "threat and enemy" (eventually we''ll figure out that needing a "threat and enemy" is the threat and enemy). But, care must be taken when reading these general conjecture articles to ensure that repetitive general conjecture is not mistaken for specific and complete evidence. Otherwise the repetitive general conjecture becomes
the a "threat and enemy".
UPDATED 02/10/2010
UPI, China says no hegemonic intention. Statements of national intentions are of course important and necessary, but insufficient without the accompanying transparent and confirming participation and cooperation for international growth and stability. It''s no longer desirable or feasible for an authoritarian nation, particularly the size of China, to shout non-hegemonic intentions from behind walls. China’s authoritarian communist party must eliminate walls, move with all diligent speed toward a civil society, and begin shouldering a portion of the heavy burden of ensuring global stability and growth.
UPDATED 02/20/2010
The Diplomat, Why China’s Naval Rise Could Help the World
"There's much more reason to be positive...I do think China wants to fit into the ''global commons.'' We just have to be careful [sic: too?] make sure they see we are trying to treat them as equals."--Diplomat quoting Eric Wertheim, US naval analyst and author of
Combat Fleets of the World--
UPDATED 02/10/2010
ExpressIndia, China''s anti-ship missile not a threat: Navy chief.
Interesting comments from India''s
Admiral Nirmal Verma on the use of a ballistic anti-ship missile:
"...Some event [sic] talk about carrying out land-based missile attacks against an aircraft carrier. We must weigh this against the difficulties of targeting a mobile target out at sea,... ...Should an adversary manage to evade a plethora of air, surface and sub-surface escorts and be capable of hitting a carrier, sinking it or putting a carrier out of action is by no means easy"--Express India quoting Admiral Verma--
UPDATED 01/11/2010
WSJ OpEd, The Taiwan Arms-Sales Equation.
"Cross-strait relations won''t progress peacefully unless Taipei can defend itself from a Chinese attack."
UPDATED 12/31/2009
UPI, China''s navy mulls push into Arabian Sea.
UPDATED 01/02/2010
UPI, China has no plans for African Navy base.
Wikimapia Aerial Map, CoCo Island, Burma
Wikimapia Aerial Map, Gwadar, Pakistan
UPDATED 05/25/2011
Dawn, ‘China agrees to run Gwadar port’
Wikimapia Aerial Map, Hambantota, Sri Lanka
-----notes-----
1. Kraska is careful to state that the views expressed in his article do not represent or reflect official U.S. Navy or Department of Defense policy. But, then goes on to indulge speculation, unproven facts, undocumented data, and liberal assumptions uncharacteristic of a navy, Law of the Sea specialist.
2. UPDATED 01/17/2010 Kraska refers to the DF-21 which has an open-source circular error of probability estimated range of 300-400 meters (see
FAS, DF-21 / CSS-5 and
SinoDefense, DongFeng 21 (CSS-5) Medium-Range Ballistic Missile, and
John Lewis and Hua Di, China''s Ballistic Missile Programs, International Security, Fall 1992 Vol. 17, No. 2, 3M pdf and
Wikipedia, Ballistic Missiles, China and
en.interpretation of Chinese blog providing the early speculation on a DF-21 antiship variant).
It's unclear whether terminal course correction of a fast moving reentry vehicle is even feasible. And if feasible whether it''s practical for use against a highly mobile and defended target like an aircraft carrier. Not to mention the nuclear retaliatory risks inherent in using a ballistic weapon for conventional tactical purposes. Distinguish the rare anti-ship ballistic missile from the common anti-ship cruise missile (e.g. Tomahawk, Sizzler, Sunburn,
Club etc.)
3. It’s likely the waters within the first string of pearls are more “acoustically wired” and monitored than a Cold War Soviet embassy.
4. It should be noted that our military officers below the level of flag (admiral) generally are not expected to think in the diplomatic terms of balancing cooperation with confrontation. However, Kraska seems to mock cooperation and partnership and assume confrontation—fortunately Kraska is not a navy flag officer.
5. Of course, some of our military and non-military leadership is moving away from past models and non-cooperative behavior. They must be open, transparent, and vocal on the need to swiftly replace obsolete models and behavior with updated learning and models. The transition will be daunting since there are currently fewer vested interests in cooperation than non-cooperation. We must begin holding our military and non-military leaderships accountable for the missed "opportunity costs" that results when they substitute taunting, threatening, and intimidation for cooperation.
6. Lost in recovery of post—related to a update between September and October 2010.
7. Britain was then the world's narcotrafficker of the world and was seeking to preserve existing markets and open new ones. A large number of Chinese were suffering from opium addiction and China sought to prevent the opium from entering its country (refer to
Opium Wars for additional information). It's instructive of historical interpretation to note that
China Goes to Sea emphasizes the Qing leaders' balance of payment concerns (opium was paid for with China's silver) that was impeding their ability to wage war in the
Xinjiang Autonomous Region(@pg 295). Not mentioning eliminating the scourge of opium addiction. Of course both concerns are interrelated and it's a matter of emphasis.
8. UPDATED 12/28/2010 Saying you have a missile without a CEP is like saying you have an aircraft carrier without planes, crew, or adequate steerage. Erickson et al. directly raises the concept of FOC (Full Operational Capability)—fundamentally the difference between missile IOC and FOC concepts is an improved CEP. It's of course not unknown for nations (including ours) to announce IOC of a missile with a totally useless or undefined CEP and then work (or waste resources) to improve or define the CEP before declaring FOC (particularly when budgets are tight and the weapon system is politically unpopular). Rarely, do such “political tactics” dupe our very capable naval intelligence officers or admirals—in fact they may even accommodate (or exploit) such tactics because it diverts (or justifies) scarce resources to a doomed and useless (desired) endeavor. Admiral Willard et al. must be applauded for raising these important issues for our open, transparent, reciprocal, dispassionate, and meaningful discussion.
9. The fascinating and durable
Shanghai Communiqué is an early example of U.S.-China agreeing to cooperate for the benefit of the global commons.
10. UPDATED 09/09/2011 Speculating about the year 2049 enables reference to
Deng's 1992 speech wherein he urged China to pursue the "basic line" (socialism with reform, and opening appended) without vacillation for 100 years. If the "basic line" is measured from the CCP's founding in 1949 plus 100 years the result is 2049.
Even if the 2049 speculation is amiss the speech is useful reading for those wanting to understand a changing China.
11. There is a set of bizarre logic routinely asserted by some persons in positions of leadership of predominantly aggressive, and assertive nations. The logic imagines all efforts aimed at ameliorating the persistent or ephemeral and real or imagined fears, phobias, or superstitions of another nation's leaders somehow demonstrates a weakness that invites an exploitative counter-aggression.
These persons do not need access to major weapon systems or positions of leadership; they need access to therapy and removal from all positions of leadership while they undergo therapy.
12. Friedberg's interest linkages include:
Defense Policy Board (DPB) Member 2007; Alexander Hamilton Society Director 2011; Long Term Strategy Group Member 2011; Naval War College, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI) Lecturer and former Graduate Professor of Core CMSI Professors 2011 (e.g. Andrew Erickson); and Henry Kissinger Scholar at the Library of Congress (Henry Kissinger is a 2011 DPB Member).
UPDATED 10/18/2011 Also,
WP, Interview with Aaron Friedberg: Is China going to displace the U.S.? for Friedberg's nonconservative credentials and current connect with the Mitt Romney campaign.
Interest linkages can produce tremendous insights and novel thinking on extraordinarily challenging issues (e.g. U.S-China relationship); or interest linkages can produce mutually reinforcing group-think orthodoxy, propaganda, and blow-back.
13. McDevitt differentiates between the America terminology of AntiAccess and Area Denial and Chinese terminology of defensive strategy (broadly and meaninglessly defined as threats to national interests), but continues the custom of referring to A2/AD generically as AntiAccess.
14. Those wanting a refresher of "Cold War" history may find John Gaddis's
The Cold War helpful.
