Commander of the Submarine Force has published a dynamic submarine force framework entitled Design for Undersea Warfare Update I (Nov 2012) and Commander’s Intent for the United States Submarine Force and Supporting Organizations December 20153. Complementing this framework document is Undersea Warfighting (July 2011), discussing common attributes historically possessed by our intrepid submariners.
UPDATED 11/21/2016 Undersea Warfare Science & Technology Strategy 2016: Enabling Strategic Innovation for the Undersea Force and Written Statement of Dr. Edward R. Franchi Acting Director Of Research U.S. Naval Research Laboratory Before The Emerging Threats And Capabilities Subcommittee Sept 2016
UPDATED 11/21/2016 CSIS, Part VI: From Cyber to Sub surface Key Operational Challenges for Innovators and Part VII: New Perspectives on Defense Innovation and Third Offset and Carter Gives Keynote Address at CSIS Conference and The Role of Space in Maritime Operations with Rear Admiral [PEO C4I] Christian Becker
UPDATED 01/04/2014 NAP, Responding to Capability Surprise: A Strategy for U.S. Naval Forces
"The goal of naval forces must be toUPDATED 12/19/2011 USNI Proceedings, Navy 2025 Forward Warfighters
always find[continuously seek]2 the best reaction to a surprise, using the fullest measure of knowledge, intelligence, experience, and talent that can be brought to bear."--@pg 145, [edits not in original]--
UPDATED 10/01/2011 Submarine Incentive Pay Increase for Senior Enlisted
Effective October 1, 2011 submarine incentive pay for E8 and E9 submariners with 18 plus years of service increases.
The pay change comes at a time of when our submarine force is considering increased platform operation tempos.
A typical fast attack (SSN) platform will spend between 80-125 operational days per year depending on transit time and initial location. At a nominal operational cost range of between $2.5-2.7 million dollars per day.
Our navy is trying to figure out how to accomplish its projected missions in the face of increasing submarine platform prices and consequent declining submarine force structure1.
UPDATED 08/08/2011 Diplomat, Submarines and a Battle of Minds
1. There is an intense debate underway between those advocating for different submarine deployment strategies ( e.g. forward presence; critical security; share the burden; and autonomous platform substitution etc.). The submarine force structure (number and type of platforms) required to implement these different submarine deployment strategies vary greatly.
It can be safely assumed: that admirals and their congressional advocates will prefer more submarine platforms too less; the number of missions will increase or decrease to fit a given submarine force structure; budgets will increase or decrease proportional to the number of mission days and submarine force structure; a submarine force structure represents an underlying military philosophy and doctrine that may or may not be current, accurate, and complete.
2. A best (optimal) reaction may not exist to be found, notwithstanding application of the committee's recommended framework. And, of course sometimes the optimal reaction to surprise will be no reaction, which ironically is often the most difficult reaction to implement!
The difficulty may result from applying Byzantine and bizarre logic, which asserts a putative and potential opponent may interpret no reaction as an inadequate or insufficient deterrent?
3. "Commander's Intent..." supersedes "Design for..."